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Unestablished Businesses and Treble
Damage Recovery Under Section Four of
the Clayton Act
Persons "injured in their business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws"' may bring a private
treble damage action under section 4 of the Clayton Act.2 Courts
differ as to whether a person can recover damages when his losses
result not from damage to an operative venture, but from foreclo-
sure of a business venture that is in a conceptual or planning
stage.3 For example, the individual may have a plan for a business
but lack such operational necessities as a plant, raw materials, em-
ployees, or customers.4 A minority of courts refuse to award dam-
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
2 Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Section 4 provides in perti-
nent part:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United
States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, with-
out respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by
him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Id. As amended in 1980, the statute also allows litigants to recover prejudgment interest on
actual damages. Id.
Section 4 is a recodification of § 7 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, which provided a
private remedy in essentially the same terms:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by any other person or
corporation by reason of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful in this act, may
sue therefor in any circuit court of the United States in the district in which the defen-
dant resides or is found, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall re-
cover three fold the damages by him sustained, and the costs of suit, including a rea-
sonable attorney's fee.
Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 209, 210 (1890) (repealed 1955) (substantially
similar language in Clayton Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976)).
Section 16 of the Clayton Act allows private injunctive relief. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976). See
infra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 5-8 and accompanying text. See generally 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER,
ANTITRUST LAW 335(c), at 174-75 (1978). This debate becomes increasingly important as
the number of private antitrust actions brought each year rises. In 1980, 1457 private anti-
trust actions were filed in U.S. district courts, compared to 228 in 1960. ADMINISTRATIvE
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1980 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 63 (1980).
4 The venture in such circumstances is generally referred to as an unestablished busi-
ness. Courts offer little help in defining the term "unestablished business," although they all
use the terms "established" and "unestablished" to describe the dichotomy discussed in this
comment. These terms were first used in Central Coal & Coke Co. v. Hartman, 111 F. 96
(8th Cir. 1901). In Central Coal, the court noted that damages for future profits are gener-
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ages in such circumstances, concluding that there is no business to
be harmed. Even when a venture operates for a short time before
being driven out of business by an antitrust violation, the minority
position refuses to award damages for lost profits because the ven-
ture lacks a sufficient profit history upon which to base an award.,
Most courts, however, assert a willingness to compensate unestab-
lished businesses for business losses such as lost profits7 because
"[i]t is as unlawful to prevent a person from engaging in business
as it is to drive a person out of business."8
ally too speculative to award, but stated that plaintiffs may recover lost future profits in
cases involving "destruction or interruption of an established business," provided that the
plaintiffs offered competent proof of these damages. Id. at 98. The court justified this excep-
tion to the rule against prospective lost profits damages on the ground that long-established
businesses could prove their capital, usual expenses, and profits for the time both before
and during the violation. Id. This suggests that an "established business" would be one that
not only had secured adequate capital, facilities, supplies, and personnel to begin operation,
but had also been operational long enough to establish levels of "usual" expenses and
profits.
For purposes of this comment, an established business is one that currently exists on a
firm, operational basis, with enough of a business history that usual expenses and profits
can be proved. An unestablished business is any venture that lacks operational necessities,
such as facilities, raw materials, personnel, or customers, or that has obtained these necessi-
ties so recently that data on "usual" expenses and profits cannot be collected. Given the
annual nature of accounting cycles, the heading "unestablished" could include ventures that
have been in operation for up to one year. The term "unestablished business" also includes
expansions by existing firms into new product or service lines. See, e.g., Laurie Visual
Etudes, Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond's, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 951, 956-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). In Lau-
rie, a firm with 20 years of experience in the music and record industry desired to enter the
medical field by marketing a medical breath exercise device. The court treated the proposed
expansion as an unestablished venture. Id.
6 See, e.g., Duff v. Kansas City Star Co., 299 F.2d 320, 325 (8th Cir. 1962); Central Coal
& Coke Co. v. Hartman, 111 F. 96, 99 (8th Cir. 1901); Cohen v. Curtis Publishing Co., 229 F.
Supp. 354, 364 (D. Minn. 1963), appeal dismissed, 333 F.2d 974 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. de-
nied, 380 U.S. 921 (1965). Some courts outside the Eighth Circuit have espoused this narrow
view of § 4 and have also limited the term "business" to established ventures. E.g.,
LaRouche v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 166 F. Supp. 633, 635 (D. Mass. 1958).
6 See, e.g., National Wrestling Alliance v. Myers, 325 F.2d 768, 775-77 (8th Cir. 1963)
(noting plaintiff's meager evidence of business history and holding plaintiff's claim too spec-
ulative to support damage award of lost future profits).
I See, e.g., Hayes v. Solomon, 597 F.2d 958, 973 (5th Cir. 1979) (plaintiff can sue for
harm to unestablished business if he intended to start business and was prepared to do so),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980); Martin v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 365 F.2d 629, 633 (5th
Cir.) (plaintiff need not have ongoing business; attempt to enter a business is sufficient),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 991 (1966); Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. National Elec. Prods.
Corp., 152 F.2d 398, 399 (3d Cir. 1945) (necessary to allege intent and preparedness to en-
gage in business); Fleer Corp. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 176, 181 (E.D. Pa.
1976) (allegation of intent and preparedness to engage in business is sufficient to give plain-
tiff standing under § 4 to sue for harm to the nascent venture). See generally 2 P. AREEDA &
D. TURNER, supra note 3, 335, at 174-75.
a Thomsen v. Union Castle Mail S.S. Co., 166 F. 251, 253 (2d Cir. 1908). See also Fleer
Corp. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 176, 180-81 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Delaware
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This comment examines the language and history of the Clay-
ton Act, as well as the policies underlying the Act, and finds that
these considerations compel neither the majority nor the minority
approach. Awarding lost profits to nascent ventures exceeds the in-
tended reach of section 4 and may deter socially beneficial behav-
ior,9 but denying any award to an entrepreneur who is kept out of
business by an antitrust violation does not adequately serve the
Clayton Act's goals of deterring and punishing antitrust viola-
tions.10 The comment suggests that the deficiencies of both ap-
proaches stem from their focus on whether there has been a loss to
"business." The comment concludes that it is more in keeping with
the language and purposes of section 4 to disregard the possibility
of business losses to unestablished ventures and to focus instead
on whether the entrepreneur has suffered an injury to his "prop-
erty." Courts applying section 4 should award damages to unestab-
lished ventures only for losses to property.
I. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Plaintiffs in section 4 actions11 typically seek to recover future
profits they will allegedly lose due to the defendant's antitrust vio-
lations.1 2 When the plaintiff is driven from a business he has been
operating for some time, his profit record provides a reasonable ba-
sis from which to infer that the antitrust violation will diminish his
future profits. 13 An unestablished business, however, has no record
Valley Marine Supply Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 184 F. Supp. 440, 443 (E.D. Pa. 1960),
aff'd, 297 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 839 (1962).
See 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 3, % 335, at 174.
10 Note, Private Treble Damage Antitrust Suits: Measure of Damages for Destruction
of All or Part of a Business, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1566, 1566-67 (1967). Many feel that deter-
rence is the first, and probably the only, goal of antitrust damages and that a damage award
that happens to compensate an injured party is merely a happy coincidence. See, e.g., Eas-
terbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CH. L. REv. 263, 319 (1981).
" Antitrust violations are of three main types: violations that tend toward cartels, such
as price fixing, which fall within § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976); violations
that tend toward monopoly, such as predatory pricing, boycotts, and tying arrangements,
which fall within § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976); and violations resulting from
the merger of competitors, largely covered under § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18
(Supp. IV 1980). See generally R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 23-35
(1976). Private actions under § 4, see supra note 2, may seek remedies for cartelization,
monopolization, or illegal mergers.
2 See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 5, 8.
's Indeed, the "before and after" damage estimate is commonly used by established
ventures to quantify their harms. This kind of analysis only works for an ongoing, estab-
lished venture with a record of past performance. See Hoyt, Dahl & Gibson, Comprehensive
Models for Assessing Lost Profits to Antitrust Plaintiffs, 60 MINN. L. REv. 1233, 1233-36
(1976); Parker, Measuring Damages in Federal Treble Damage Actions, 17 ANTITRUST
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of operations and profits upon which to base predictions of future
losses. And the high failure rate of new businesses makes it even
more difficult to relate the losses of an unestablished business to
an antitrust violation; it is more likely that an unestablished busi-
ness would never have been profitable than that it would lose prof-
its due to an antitrust violation. 14 Despite this problem, most
courts define "business" broadly15 and interpret the "injury to bus-
iness" portion of section 416 to permit awards of lost future profits
to unestablished business ventures. These courts allow recovery to
those plaintiffs who can show both intent and preparedness to en-
gage in the venture. 17 Two possible justifications for such an ex-
BULL. 497, 501 (1972); Rulon, Proof of Damages for Terminated or Precluded Plaintiffs, 49
ANTITRUST L.J. 153, 159 (1980).
14 Researchers have shown that 95% of all new businesses eventually terminate, discon-
tinue, go bankrupt, reorganize, or exit for other reasons. See Star & Massel, Survival Rates
for Retailers, 57 J. RE'rAILING 87, 88 (1981). In fact, the first years of a company's operations
are the most uncertain. One study showed that in retailing, a high-turnover industry, only
35.1% of new ventures survive through the fifth year. Id. at 93 (Table 2). Dun & Bradstreet
notes that of 7919 business failures in 1977, over half were five years old or younger. Busi-
NESS AND ECONOMICS DISION OF DUN & BRADsTREET, INC., THE BUSINESS FAILURE RECORD
FOR 1977, at 2, 10 (1978). On problems in use of the term "failure" in these statistics, see
generally Cochran, Small Business Mortality Rates: A Review of the Literature, 19 J.
SMALL BUS. MGMT. 50 (1981).
15 For example, the Seventh Circuit defined the word "business" as
that which habitually busies, or engages, time, attention or labor, as a principal serious
concern or interest. In a somewhat more truly economic, legal and industrial sense, it
includes that which occupies the time, attention, and labor of men for the purpose of
livelihood or profit,-persistent human efforts which have for their end pecuniary re-
ward. It denotes "the employment or occupation in which a person is engaged to pro-
cure a living."
Roseland v. Phister Mfg. Co., 125 F.2d 417, 419 (7th Cir. 1942) (quoting Allen v. Common-
wealth, 188 Mass. 59, 61, 74 N.E. 287, 288 (1905)). The Second Circuit referred to business
as
"the occupation, the engaging, the doing of the varied commercial acts, and the taking
of the requisite steps from which result conclusions and conditions." . . . "[Business]
means the activity, the energy, the capacity, the opportunities by which results are
reached-a condition rather than fixed tangible objects for which conditions arise."
Sullivan v. Associated Billposters & Distribs. of the United States & Can., 6 F.2d 1000, 1010
(2d Cir. 1925) (quoting Atlantic Postal Tel.-Cable Co. v. Mayor of Savannah, 133 Ga. 66, 73-
74, 65 S.E. 184, 188 (1909)).
" See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
17 See supra note 7. Some commentators assert that the Supreme Court held unestab-
lished businesses eligible to sue under the antitrust laws in American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). See Collen, Procedural Directions in Antitrust Treble Dam-
age Litigation: An Overview of Changing Judicial Attitudes, 17 ANTITRUST BULL. 997, 1025
(1972); Comment, Standing Under Clayton § 4: A Proverbial Mystery, 77 DICK. L. REV. 73,
90 (1972). The Supreme Court did affirm the Second Circuit decision, which held, inter alia,
that "'it is as unlawful to prevent a person from engaging in business as it is to drive a
person out of business."' 166 F. 261, 264 (2d Cir. 1908) (quoting Thomsen v. Union Castle
Mail S.S. Co., 166 F. 251, 253 (2d Cir. 1908)). The Supreme Court, however, dealt not with
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pansive reading of section 4 are the specific language and history of
the Clayton Act and the general deterrence theory of antitrust
law.18
this issue but with the jurisdiction of the circuit court to hear a case concerning acts done
outside the United States. The circuit court had affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the
complaint for failure to state a cause of action on this basis, American Banana Co., 166 F.
at 267, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Thus, the private antitrust remedy was never at
issue and was not even addressed in dicta by the Court.
The Supreme Court has dealt with some aspects of standing in the antitrust area. For
example, the Court addressed the ability of indirect purchasers to sue for damages in Illinois
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) (indirect purchasers not allowed to sue under § 4).
See also Landes & Posner, Should Indirect Purchasers Have Standing to Sue Under the
Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois Brick, 46 U. Cm. L. REV. 602
(1979). The analysis of Illinois Brick, however, amounted to a debate over which of two
possible plaintiffs (direct or indirect purchasers) should be given standing to sue to redress a
single antitrust violation. The unestablished-business question, by contrast, concerns
whether an entire class of harms caused by any kind of antitrust violation should be reme-
died by § 4's treble damage action at all. Thus, analogy to these authorities is inappropriate.
"8 Constitutional standing requirements place a threshold limitation on the ability of
unestablished businesses to recover under § 4. The Constitution grants the federal courts
power to decide only "cases" and "controversies." U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2. The courts have
long read this as limiting their power to hear only justiciable cases in an adversarial context,
and this has given rise to standing requirements. C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, 13
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531 (1975).
To bring a suit in federal court, a plaintiff must meet two conditions. First, he must
allege that he was injured in fact, thereby demonstrating that he has "a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). See also Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 260-61 (1976); Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968). Second, he must demonstrate a causal connection between
his injury and the defendant's actions. Village of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 261. The
plaintiff has the burden of proof of causation. See id. The plaintiff has a similar burden in
the context of antitrust standing. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S.
477, 489 (1977); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 114 n.9 (1969);
California Computer Prods. v. IBM, 613 F.2d 727, 732 (9th Cir. 1979).
Many courts refer to the "business or property" language as a standing requirement.
See, e.g., Pan-Islamic Trade Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 632 F.2d 539, 546 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 927 (1981); Solinger v. A&M Records, Inc., 586 F.2d 1304, 1309 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 908 (1978); Tugboat, Inc. v. Mobile Towing Co., 534 F.2d 1172, 1174
(5th Cir. 1976); Laurie Visual Etudes, Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond's, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 951,
955 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Fleer Corp. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 176, 179 (D.
Del. 1971); N.W. Controls, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 333 F. Supp. 493, 506 (D. Del.
1971). Commentators sometimes refer to the § 4 language as a standing requirement also.
See, e.g., 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 3, 334, at 163-70; Klingsberg, Bull's Eyes
and Carom Shots: Complications and Conflicts on Standing to Sue and Causation Under
Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 16 ANTITRUST BULL. 351, 352 (1971); 3 W. NEW ENG. L. REV.
81, 86 (1980). This reference is inapt, however, since the true standing threshold in the
constitutional sense involves only injury-in-fact and causation, as indicated in the discussion
above.
The Supreme Court recently discussed standing under § 4 and reaffirmed that "Con-
gress did not intend to allow every person tangentially affected by an antitrust violation to
maintain an action to recover threefold damages for the injury to his business or property."
Blue Shield v. McCready, 102 S. Ct. 2540, 2547 (1982). To effectuate this limited intent, the
Court proposed a two-part test to determine the sufficiency of the causal link:
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A. The Statute
The language of section 4 is sweeping and general. Its authori-
zation for "any person" to "sue. .. in any district court. . with-
out respect to the amount in controversy" 19 suggests a broad reme-
dial purpose. Courts have used this language as the basis of an
expansive interpretation of the statute,20 but such an interpreta-
tion ignores the express limits contained in section 4. The statute
remedies injury only to "business or property by reason of any-
thing forbidden in the antitrust laws." 21 A basic principle of statu-
tory construction is that nontechnical terms of a statute should be
given their usual meaning.2 2 The broad construction of the term
[W]e look (1) to the physical and economic nexus between the alleged violation and the
harm to the plaintiff, and, (2) more particularly, to the relationship of the injury al-
leged with those forms of injury about which Congress was likely to have been con-
cerned in making defendant's conduct unlawful and in providing a private remedy
under § 4.
Id. at 2548. The Court's language, however, gives lower courts little guidance in applying the
test. Prior to McCready, lower courts devised tests based on the directness of the injury, its
foreseeability, or its presence within the defendant's target area. Id. at 2547 n.12. Because
the Supreme Court refused "to evaluate the relative utility of any of these possibly conflict-
ing approaches," id., it is unclear how the lower courts will respond. For a description of
lower court tests prior to McCready, see 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 3, 1 334(d);
Alioto & Donnici, Standing Requirements for Antitrust Plaintiffs: Judicially Created Ex-
ceptions to a Clear Statutory Policy, 4 U.S.F.L. Rav. 205, 212-14 (1970).
This comment assumes that the unestablished businesses considered here can satisfy
the constitutional standing requirements and that the defendants have indeed violated the
antitrust laws, thereby harming the plaintiffs. The questions the comment addresses are
strictly statutory- does § 4 provide a remedy for unestablished businesses, and, if so, what is
that remedy?
19 Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976) (emphasis added).
20 E.g., Blue Shield v. McCready, 102 S. Ct. 2540, 2545 (1982); Reiter v. Sonotone
Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 337 (1979) ("On its face, § 4 contains little in the way of restrictive
language."); Hoopes v. Union Oil Co., 374 F.2d 480, 486 (9th Cir. 1967). In Hoopes, the court
used § 4's broad language as the basis for its conclusion that the Clayton Act is "'compre-
hensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all who are made victims of the forbidden
practices by whomever they may be perpetrated.'" Id. (quoting Mandeville Island Farms v.
American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948)).
21 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). The Supreme Court has characterized the "by reason of" lan-
guage as a limitation on the kinds of harm remedied by § 4. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo
Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1976); see also In re Indus. Gas Antitrust Litig., 681
F.2d 514, 520 (7th Cir. 1982). The "business or property" language is also a limit, narrowing
the class of injuries for which § 4's treble damage awards are available. Reiter v. Sonotone
Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979) ("business or property" language is restrictive); Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100, 1157-58 (E.D. Pa. 1981). See also 2
P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 3, 333, at 161 (noting that "'business or property,'"
"[a]lthough imprecise, . . . are words of limitation").
22 Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods. Co., 322 U.S. 607, 618 (1944) (when legislation is
not expressed in technical terms, words must be given the meaning an ordinary man would
give them).
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"business" in section 4 is contrary to the common, everyday defini-
tions of that term.23 It is contradictory for a court to require that
"business" be given its usual meaning,24 yet compensate a "busi-
ness" that has not exchanged any goods or services and that con-
sists of a single experienced person, some money, and a contract.25
A selective reading of the legislative history of the Clayton
Act, however, lends some support to a broad construction of sec-
tion 4. When passed in 1914,26 the private remedies provided in
sections 4 and 16 of the Act 2 7 were intended to strengthen existing
remedies.28 Some supporters felt the Act would greatly expand the
private remedies. Representative Webb, for example, explained
that the section that became section 4 "opens the door of justice to
every man, whenever he may be injured by those who violate the
antitrust laws, and gives the injured party ample damages for the
wrong suffered. '29 Since then, the Supreme Court has noted the
section's broad scope and stated that it provides a cause of action
for all who are victims of antitrust violations.30 It is conceivable,
22 Common definitions of business describe it as a "commercial or mercantile activity
customarily engaged in as a means of livelihood," WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 302 (4th ed. 1976), and "[t]hat which habitually busies or occupies or engages
the time, attention, labor, and effort of persons, as a principal serious concern or interest or
for livelihood or profit," BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 179 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). The definitions'
verb tenses and word choices support the common-sense notion that "businesses" are oper-
ating, commercial ventures.
2 For examples of courts requiring that "business" have its usual meaning, see Hawaii
v. Standard Oil Co., 431 F.2d 1282, 1285 (9th Cir. 1970), afi'd, 405 U.S. 251 (1972); Roseland
v. Phister Mfg. Co., 125 F.2d 417, 419 (7th Cir. 1942); Image & Sound Serv. Corp. v. Altec
Serv. Corp., 148 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D. Mass. 1956).
25 These minor steps can qualify a venture as a business under the intent and prepared-
ness test. See infra notes 81-89 and accompanying text.
11 The chronology of the Act's passage is found in 2 THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES 1026-37 (E. Kintner ed. 1978) [hereinafter
cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
11 Clayton Act, ch. 323, §§ 4, 16, 38 Stat. 730, 731, 737 (1914) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)). See supra note 2.
28 Levy, The Clayton Law-An Imperfect Supplement to the Sherman Law, 3 VA. L.
REV. 411, 415-17 (1916). The Clayton Act also strengthens private remedies by allowing final
judgments in actions brought by the United States to serve as prima facie evidence against
the same defendant in subsequent private actions. See Clayton Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1976
& Supp. IV 1980).
29 51 CONG. REC. 9073 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Webb), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY, supra note 26, at 1192. Representative Webb became Chairman of the House Judici-
ary Committee, in which the bill originated, when former Chairman Clayton resigned to
accept a federal judgeship three days after Webb made these remarks. 2 LEGISLATIVE His-
TORY, supra note 26, at 1003-04.
20 Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236
(1948) ("The Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all who are made
victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may be perpetrated." (citation omit-
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then, that the Act provides a lost profits remedy for unestablished
businesses.
The legislative history, however, does not clearly support such
a broad interpretation."1 Legislators considering the Clayton Act
expressed concern about in terrorem use of private treble damage
actions. They objected to certain provisions which they feared
would allow an unhealthy expansion of the private remedy.3 2 Im-
plicit in these concerns is the idea that treble damages should not
be awarded easily. Consistent with these statements, virtually all
federal courts, including the Supreme Court, agree that "Congress
did not intend the antitrust laws to provide a remedy in damages
for all injuries that might conceivably be traced to an antitrust
violation. '33
Further support for a narrow construction of section 4 comes
from an examination of the Clayton Act in its entirety. Section 16
of the Act allows private litigants to seek injunctions to stop any
threatened injury 3 not just injuries to business or property. Al-
though the legislative history does not explain why Congress in-
cluded the "business or property" language in section 4 alone, 5
"[t]he most likely explanation lies in the essential differences be-
tween the two remedies."3 6 Multiple injunctions usually affect a
defendant no differently than a single injunction would because he
will have to behave identically whether ordered to do so once or
many times. In contrast, multiplication of treble damage awards
magnifies the liability to which the defendant is subject.3 7 Accord-
ted)), quoted in Blue Shield v. McCready, 102 S. Ct. 2540, 2545 (1982).
31 See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 342-43 (1979) ("Nowhere in the legisla-
tive record is specific reference made to the intended scope of those terms.").
2 The provision allowing the admission of a final judgment in a government suit as
conclusive evidence in a private suit for a related violation, H.R. 15,657, 63d Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 5 (1914), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 26, at 1082, was the subject of
"serious objection." H.R. REP. No. 627, (pt. 2), 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1914) (minority
views), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 26, at 1131. This provision was
amended in later debate on the bill to allow the final judgment in a government suit to serve
as prima facie evidence in a related private suit. See 51 CONG. REc. 13,907 (1914), reprinted
in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 26, at 1835-36; see also supra note 28.
33 Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 263 n.14 (1972). See also Blue Shield v.
McCready, 102 S. Ct. 2540, 2547-48 (1982); In re Indus. Gas Antitrust Litig., 681 F.2d 514,
515 (7th Cir. 1982); Tugboat, Inc. v. Mobile Towing Co., 534 F.2d 1172, 1175 (5th Cir. 1976).
3 Section 16 provides that "[a]ny person, firm, corporation, or association shall be enti-
tled to sue for and have injunctive relief, in any court of the United States having jurisdic-
tion over the parties, against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws."
Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976).
35 Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 261 (1972).
36 Id.
3 Id. at 261-62. Professor Polinsky compared damage and injunctive remedies in nui-
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ingly, Congress may well have extended the injunctive, and not the
damages, remedy to a broader class of plaintiffs "to prevent an an-
titrust defendant from being subjected to a myriad of treble-dam-
age suits by all those in any way affected by an antitrust viola-
tion. '3  The difference between section 4 and section 16 suggests
that the "business or property" language of section 4 is designed to
limit its reach.
The severity of imposing treble damages also suggests that
Congress meant "business or property" to limit the occasions when
section 4 awards are made; 9 "the potency of the remedy implies
the need for some care in its application. 4 Provisions for multiple
damages are classified as "penal" in that their effects are puni-
tive.41 Although the canon of construction that penal statutes
should be construed strictly42 is not the only factor relevant to the
interpretation of a statute,43 it supports the conclusion that the
"business or property" requirement should not be the basis for an
expansive construction of section 4.
sance disputes and noted that injunctions may also be inefficient solutions. One example of
such an inefficiency is when a plaintiff obtains an injunction and then "extorts" a large sum
from the defendant in return for surrendering the right to enforce the injunction. Since the
defendant will be willing to pay a sum slightly less than his entire profit to keep his plant
open, the plaintiff may arguably receive more than his actual damages. Polinsky, Resolving
Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN.
L. REV. 1075, 1077 (1980). This inefficiency may mean that society as a whole would be
worse off with multiple injunctions than with multiple damage claims. Polinsky concludes,
however, that damages are not always better; similar strategic behavior patterns may arise
under a damage scheme. Id. at 1111-12. Further, in terms of impact on the individual defen-
dant, the multiple treble damage remedy could have a much greater effect than multiple
injunctions.
38 Pan-Islamic Trade Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 632 F.2d 539, 547 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 927 (1981). See also Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 260 (1972)
(§§ 4 and 16 "notably different"); id. at 262 ("striking contrast between potential impact of
suits for injunctive relief and suits for damages").
" Tugboat, Inc. v. Mobile Towing Co., 534 F.2d 1172, 1175 (5th Cir. 1976) (noting that
treble damage remedy merits more demanding standing rules). The right to recover treble
damages "is an unusual one, the remedy is drastic, and the [antitrust] Acts are to be strictly
construed and not to be enlarged by construction." Westor Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros.
Pictures, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 757, 762 (D.N.J. 1941) (footnotes omitted), quoted in Image &
Sound Serv. Corp. v. Altec Serv. Corp., 148 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D. Mass. 1956).
40 Blue Shield v. McCready, 102 S. Ct. 2540, 2548 (1982).
4' 3 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 59.02 (C. Sands 4th ed.
1974).
42 Id. § 59.03.
43 Id. § 59.06.
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B. Deterrence Goals of Antitrust Law
Commentators4 and courts45 increasingly construe the intent
of the antitrust laws to be promotion of allocative efficiency. 46 The
sole function of the private damage remedy of section 4 in this
view is to deter potential antitrust violators.47 Firms will not vio-
late the law if their gain from the antitrust violation is less than
their expected cost, which would include any expected antitrust
damages or penalties.4' Because an increase in private damage
awards would make violations more costly, increasing the number
of section 4 suits, hence awards, could serve the deterrent purposes
of antitrust law.
The class of harms that section 4's "business" clause may
compensate will affect the deterrent effect of the statute. If courts
define the clause broadly and allow many unestablished businesses
to bring private antitrust suits, the chance that any particular vio-
lator will be forced to pay treble damages will increase. Increasing
the opportunities for an "injured party to recover damages . . .
4 Judge (formerly Professor) Richard Posner and Professor Frank Easterbrook are per-
haps the most vocal proponents of this proposition. See R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, AN-
TITRUST: CASES, ECONoMIc NOTES AND OTHER MATERIALS 154 (2d ed. 1981) ("Probably most
(but certainly not all) scholars today accept the proposition that the antitrust laws have, or
should be treated as having, the sole goal of consumer welfare or efficiency."). See also R.
BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 66 (1978) ("The Sherman Act was clearly presented and
debated as a consumer welfare prescription.").
4 See, e.g., In re Indus. Gas Antitrust Litig., 681 F.2d 514, 516 (7th Cir. 1982) ("From
the class of injured persons suffering an 'antitrust injury' only those parties who can most
efficiently vindicate the purposes of the antitrust laws have standing to maintain a private
action under § 4."). See generally Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979); Illinois
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp.,
392 U.S. 481 (1968). Professor Page notes that although these three Supreme Court deci-
sions are not expressed in economic terms, they are consistent with an economic interpreta-
tion of antitrust damages because they interpret the antitrust statute as a deterrent. Page,
Antitrust Damages and Economic Efficiency: An Approach to Antitrust Injury, 47 U. CHI.
L. REv. 467, 472-74 (1980).
46 A complete presentation of the economics of antitrust law is beyond the scope of this
comment. For a clear explanation of the economic theory of antitrust, see R. POSNER, supra
note 11.
47 See, e.g., Blue Shield v. McCready, 102 S. Ct. 2540, 2546 n.10 (1982); see R. POSNER,
supra note 11, at 221-24; Page, supra note 45, at 472-73. See also Easterbrook, supra note
10, at 319 (arguing that deterrence is the first and probably the only goal of antitrust
damages).
48 Page, supra note 45, at 472. The economic theory behind treble damages is that dam-
ages must be multiplied because the chance of detection is less than certain. If the chance of
detection is one in three, treble damages will give the proper incentive because the probable
fine, discounted by the likelihood of its imposition, will equal the social cost of the violation.
For at least some antitrust violations, the chance of detection is greater than one in three
and treble damages are therefore economically excessive. R. POSNER, supra note 11, at 226-
27.
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[will] provide greater respect for the Act""' and deter potential vi-
olators from engaging in anticompetitive activities.50 A broad defi-
nition of the clause, therefore, appears to be consistent with the
deterrence goal of the law. At some point, however, more plaintiffs
will seek damages than are necessary to deter violations: while the
fear of large penalties will cause fewer people to violate the law,
the hope of large treble damage awards will encourage more pri-
vate plaintiffs to try to apprehend the decreasing number of viola-
tors." Ultimately, the mixed signals sent by the high fine will
cause potential plaintiffs to spend an excessive amount of money
on section 4 enforcement suits, a wasteful and therefore undesir-
able result.5 2
"' Maltz v. Sax, 134 F.2d 2, 5 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 772 (1943).
50 Economists make a similar argument. They note that as the probability of detection
and conviction increases, the expected cost of engaging in illegal behavior increases, with the
likely effect of deterring possible violations. See Landes & Posner, The Private Enforce-
ment of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4-5, 8-9 (1975).
5, Id. at 9; see Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972) (treble damages
encourage private plaintiffs "to serve as 'private attorneys general' ").
52 Landes & Posner, supra note 50, at 15. See also In re Indus. Gas Antitrust Litig., 681
F.2d 514, 515 (7th Cir. 1982) ("[T]o read § 4's language literally would inevitably lead to
excessively complex or numerous suits as well as awards unrelated to the social cost of the
antitrust violation.").
Similarly, the availability of a lost-profits, treble-damage remedy for unestablished
businesses may encourage inefficient conduct. An entrepreneur who knows of an antitrust
violation may plan a business that he knows could not succeed in the face of the antitrust
violation. To satisfy the intent and preparedness test, he may complete a contract, see infra
note 88 and accompanying text, or he may go so far as to operate the business for a short
time. His expectation would be that the treble damage remedy would exceed his investment,
if any, in the venture.
The Supreme Court has specifically refused to allow recovery in such cases, however,
declaring that a venture "could not be called into being in order to maintain a suit for
conduct that made it not pay to be born. Claims for such antenatal detriments are not much
favored by the law." Buckeye Powder Co. v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours Powder Co., 248 U.S.
55, 64 (1918) (citation omitted). It may, however, be difficult to distinguish such sham oper-
ations from ventures initiated in good faith. In Buckeye Powder Co., the Court had no
trouble with this issue; the plaintiff there had been a corporate insider of the defendant
corporation, having left its employ ostensibly to start his own business. Id. at 63. The facts
of the case disclosed that the plaintiff "knew all the elements of the situation before he
embarked on the venture, and did not do so until the [defendant] Company had reached the
height of its power." Id.
In general, one could distinguish good faith ventures by using a constructive intent test,
in which plaintiffs would be presumed to act in good faith. One could guard against
fabricated suits by weighing against this presumption plaintiff's actual or imputed knowl-
edge of defendant's violation, the fact that the violation was open and notorious and pre-
dated plaintiff's business attempt, and a paucity of acts taken by plaintiff to set up the
business.
A helpful analogy is the tort law doctrine of "coming to a nuisance." Standard tort law
holds that if an individual acquires land that is harmed by a nuisance that existed before he
bought the land, he has as much right as other landowners to sue to remedy the nuisance's
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Excessive private antitrust enforcement can also lead to ineffi-
cient levels of deterrence. A properly operating system of private
law enforcement will establish fines equal to the social cost of the
prohibited activity. In antitrust, the optimal fine is equal to the
sum of the monopolist's profit and the deadweight loss of monop-
oly to society.53 When such a fine is imposed, the monopolist will
only continue his anticompetitive conduct if the gain in profits and
resource savings exceeds this fine.5'
If a series of unestablished businesses can sue, and in so doing
raise the expected fine above the social cost of monopoly, socially
beneficial antitrust violations will be needlessly deterred.5 The
difference between optimal deterrence and overdeterrence is not
easily stated. Given the large number of people who could claim
lost profits to unestablished ventures and the speculative nature of
their claims,56 however, it seems likely that awarding damages to
them all would impose penalties on antitrust violators in excess of
the social costs of their violations. Thus, a proper understanding of
the deterrence policy underlying the Clayton Act also suggests that
section 4 should not be construed too generously.
II. PRIVATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT BY THE UNESTABLISHED
BUSINESS
The language and purposes of section 4 require that some lim-
its be placed on awards for lost profits to unestablished businesses.
Judicial requirements that section 4 compensate unique and non-
speculative injuries should guide the selection of specific limita-
disturbance of his rights. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 91, at 611 (4th ed.
1971). Some courts limit this doctrine by requiring the party who came to the nuisance to
have done so in good faith and not to have purchased the land solely for the purpose of
bringing a vexatious lawsuit. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 840D comment c, illus-
tration 2 (1979). This doctrine suggests that the fact examination required by the proposed
constructive intent test would be a practical way to identify bad faith claims.
53 R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, supra note 44, at 550.
U The potential antitrust violator will compare the costs and benefits of his action. The
benefits of an antitrust violation are his monopoly profits and any cost savings resulting
from the combination. An optimal fine, the monopolist's profit plus the deadweight monop-
oly loss to society (the social cost), will deter violations whenever the deadweight loss of
monopoly exceeds the cost savings (the social benefit of the violation). If the fine is larger
than optimal, it will deter conduct even when the social benefit of the violation exceeds the
social cost. Page, supra note 45, at 472.
" There are arguably "efficient" monopolies that are socially beneficial because of cost
savings associated with combination. Excessive private enforcement could lead to the de-
struction of these efficient monopolies, to society's detriment and contrary to the goals of
antitrust. Id.
" See infra notes 70-80 and accompanying text.
1982] 1087
The University of Chicago Law Review
tions on such awards.
A. Private Enforcement Should Remedy Unique Harms
Private actions are essential to the enforcement of the anti-
trust laws. Because the government cannot prosecute every anti-
trust violation, private enforcement increases the likelihood of pe-
nalizing antitrust violations, particularly those that are local in
character.57 A private plaintiff serves the public function of ensur-
ing a competitive economy by bringing antitrust damage suits, and
thus he is often referred to as a "private attorney general.15  The
function of the private plaintiff, however, is not identical to that of
the United States Attorney General.5 9 The private plaintiff's statu-
tory authority is limited to those cases in which he is "injured in
his business or property by anything forbidden in the antitrust
laws." 60 That limitation has been expressed as follows:
No private litigant has the right to take upon himself the role
of the Attorney General in the enforcement of the antitrust
laws ....
It is the Attorney General who applies for enforcement of
the antitrust laws in the public interest. When the private liti-
gant sues, he must establish his right to redress for the partic-
ular wrong done to him. 1
57 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 3, 331(b), at 149-50.
58 Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972) (treble damages encourage pri-
vate plaintiffs "to serve as 'private attorneys general' "); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine
Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969) (private actions "provide private relief" and
serve "the high purpose of enforcing the antitrust laws"); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Inter-
national Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 147 (1968) (Fortas, J., concurring) (" 'private attorneys
general' ").
59 The Attorney General has a duty to institute proceedings to prevent and restrain the
antitrust violations listed in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-8 (1976), regardless of who will suffer harm from
the violations. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4, 9 (1976). Additionally, the Attorney General may sue for
damages when the United States is injured in its business or property, but the damage
award is not tripled. 15 U.S.C. § 15a (1976). The private plaintiff, however, may only sue for
damages or injunctive relief when he has suffered or will suffer harm from the violation.
15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
'o Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
61 Zenith Radio Corp. v. RCA, 106 F. Supp. 561, 576 (D. Del. 1952). See also Robinson
v. Lull, 145 F. Supp. 134, 137 (N.D. Ill. 1956) (private citizen, unlike Attorney General, must
show injury to property). Private plaintiffs also should not be allowed to use their "private
attorney general" status to seek evidence to support a hunch or suspicion of a cause of
action. Waldron v. Cities Serv. Co., 361 F.2d 671, 673 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'd sub nom. First
Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253 (1968).
From an economic perspective, some argue that too much emphasis on the private
causes of action is inefficient. See R. POSNER, supra note 11, at 227-29. Judge Posner points
out, however, that the field of private antitrust actions may be "calming down" compared to
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Too broad a construction of section 4 would be inconsistent with
the requirement that the plaintiff allege a harm unlike that done
to the general public.6 2
The requirement of a unique injury underlies the Supreme
Court's ruling in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois3 that indirect pur-
chasers could not sue under section 4 for the antitrust overcharges
passed on to them; 4 if both the direct and indirect purchasers
could recover, the antitrust violator might be forced to pay twice
for a single wrong.6 5 In the recent case of Blue Shield v. Mc-
Cready,66 the Court recognized that the risk of duplicative recov-
ery was a "consideration of statutory policy" 7 justifying limita-
tions on the availability of the section 4 remedy.8
Allowing unestablished businesses to sue for lost future profits
risks unjustified multiple recovery. Because the failure rate of new
businesses is high," giving unestablished businesses a cause of ac-
tion for "business" harms, such as lost profits, would allow many
to recover when, absent the violation, only a few would have sur-
vived long enough to earn profits. It is likely that the harm of be-
ing prevented from starting a business is one shared by many, but
only after a venture is established and is harmed in some unique
way can a harm to business occur that is different from the harm
suffered by the general entrepreneurial public. The cause of action
recognized under section 4, therefore, should be broad enough to
the prior tendency to overprosecute. This suggests that reliance on the private action to
deter and punish violators is not totally misplaced. Id. at 229-30. See generally Landes &
Posner, supra note 17, at 605-06.
'2 Brownlee v. Malco Theatres, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 312, 316-17 (W.D. Ark. 1951). Even
cases that adopt a broad definition of "business" and use the intent and preparedness test
acknowledge that the plaintiff's harm must be different from that done by the defendant to
the general public. See id.
This limitation on the private action is supported by efficiency concerns. The larger the
group affected by an antitrust violation and the more alike their harms, the more efficient it
will be to have the claims argued and decided in one case. The United States Attorney
General is probably the most efficient prosecutor in such cases, since he, more than any
individual or subgroup of plaintiffs, has resources to collect data about the entire group.
Private actions should only be brought when an individual plaintiff is better able than the
Attorney General to present evidence of the plaintiff's own unique harm, thus justifying the
cost of bringing suit separately. For an expression of concern that the burgeoning use of
private actions tends to retard rather than promote competition, see R. POSNER, supra note
11, at 227-29.
63 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
11 Id. at 745-46.
65 Id. at 730-31.
:6 102 S. Ct. 2540 (1982).
71 Id. at 2545.
*s Id. at 2545-46.
, See supra note 14.
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protect the interests of unestablished businesses that are able to
prove unique injuries, but not so broad as to foster duplicative
recoveries.
B. Speculative Damages
The requirement that there be a unique antitrust injury is re-
lated to a concern that damages not be awarded on a speculative
basis.70 In the early years of antitrust enforcement, courts often
refused to award damages to unestablished businesses, characteriz-
ing such awards as too speculative:7 1 "If anything is speculative,
remote and contingent, it is the net income from a business never
begun, upon premises never occupied, during a period of time but
partially elapsed. ' '7 2 The period between the late 1800's and 1939
was one of judicial conservatism during which precise showings of
damage were required. 3
By the middle of this century, however, courts were holding
that difficulty of proof would not destroy a right of recovery; proof
of the extent of damage did not need to be precise if there was
specific proof of the fact of damage.7' Once a plaintiff proved he
70 See 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 3, 1 335(a), at 170 ("plaintiffs for whom
damages are non-existent or unduly speculative may properly be denied standing alto-
gether"). Whether the plaintiff's theory of damages is speculative is one of the issues on the
merits and is unrelated to the issue of standing or to questions of statutory construction.
Standing is an inquiry regarding justiciability; as such, its focus is on the parties, not on the
issues. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968). See generally C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, supra note 18, § 3531. If one interpretation of "business" would give standing to a
broad class of unestablished businesses that have only speculative damage claims, however,
that interpretation may, as a matter of statutory construction, be less desirable than a nar-
rower interpretation that saves courts from having to examine and reject each case brought
by an unestablished plaintiff. See Blue Shield v. McCready, 102 S. Ct. 2540, 2546-47 n.11
(1982) ("the feasibility and consequences of implementing particular damages theories may,
in certain limited circumstances, be considered in determining who is entitled to prosecute
an action brought under § 4").
On accepted methods for measuring damages, see generally Collen, supra note 17; Hoyt,
Dahl & Gibson, supra note 13; Parker, supra note 13; Rulon, supra note 13; Note, supra
note 10.
7, E.g., Central Coal & Coke Co. v. Hartman, 111 F. 96, 98 (8th Cir. 1901); see generally
Hair v. Barnes, 26 Ill. App. 580, 583-84 (1887) (contract breach; damages too speculative);
Red v. City Council, 25 Ga. 386, 390 (1857) (contract breach not found; even if found, dam- "
ages too speculative).
72 Kenny v. Collier, 79 Ga. 743, 746 (1887).
71 See Guilfoil, Damage Determination in Private Antitrust Suits, 42 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 647, 647 (1967).
7 Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 392 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835
(1957); Chiplets, Inc. v. June Dairy Prods. Co., 114 F. Supp. 129, 143-44 (D.N.J. 1953); Tim-
berlake, The Legal Injury Requirements and Proof of Damages in Treble Damage Actions
Under the Antitrust Laws, 30 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 231, 254 (1961).
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had been injured by the defendant's activity, the jury was allowed
to infer the extent of the harm. Courts today are willing to award
damages based on economists' profit projections derived from ex-
trapolation or comparison; nevertheless, most courts continue to
denounce speculative damage claims and deny recovery when dam-
age theories are too speculative, even when the fact of damage has
been alleged.75
It is unclear when an award is speculative under contemporary
standards, but most courts require that antitrust awards at least
meet the "target area" test, which holds that the injury must occur
within the area at which the defendant aimed his violation.7 6 A
common rationale for this test is that "many remotely situated
persons may suffer damage in some degree as the result of an anti-
trust violation, [but] their damage is usually much more specula-
tive and difficult to prove than that of a competitor who is an im-
mediate victim of the violation."7 7 Although some damage awards
to unestablished businesses under section 4 are appropriate under
that rationale, 78 lost profit awards to unestablished ventures
clearly are not. To make such an award, not only must the court
speculate about future losses, as it would in the case of an estab-
lished business, but it must also hypothesize the very basis upon
which future losses ordinarily are calculated.79 Whether by the tar-
" See Chrysler Credit Corp. v. J. Truett Payne Co., 670 F.2d 575, 581-82 (5th Cir.
1982); American Infra-Red Radiant Co. v. Lambert Indus., 360 F.2d 977, 995-96 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 920 (1966); Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d
383, 392 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963); Herman Schwabe, Inc. v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 297 F.2d 906, 909-10 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 865 (1962); Denver
Petroleum Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 306 F. Supp. 289, 309 (D. Colo. 1969); Siegfried v. Kansas
City Star Co., 193 F. Supp. 427, 429-30 (W.D. Mo. 1961), aff'd, 298 F.2d 1 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 819 (1962); Delaware Valley Marine Supply Co. v. American Tobacco Co.,
184 F. Supp. 440, 445 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd, 297 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 839 (1962). The Supreme Court may have signalled the end of this judicial conserva-
tism in Blue Shield v. McCready, 102 S. Ct. 2540 (1982), where the Court noted that the
fear of speculative damages had no application to McCready's suit. Id. at 2547 n.11 ("§ 4
plainly focuses on tangible economic injury," but once such injury is shown, a "cautious
approach to speculative, abstract or impractical damages has no application").
76 Pan-Islamic Trade Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 632 F.2d 539, 548 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 927 (1981); Larry R. George Sales Co. v. Cool Attic Corp., 587 F.2d 266, 271
(5th Cir. 1979); Calderone Enters. Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d
1292, 1295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972); 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER,
supra note 3, 334(c), at 165-68.
77 Calderone Enters. Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292, 1295
(2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972).
78 See infra notes 90-103 and accompanying text.
71 One method that might be employed to calculate damages in such circumstances is
the "yardstick" method. Under this method, the lost earnings of a foreclosed or destroyed
business are measured by the earnings realized by a comparable business during the rele-
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get area test or some other device, section 4 should be limited to
avoid encouraging or compensating such speculative claims.80
III. LIMITING THE SCOPE OF AWARDS TO UNESTABLISHED
BUSINESSES
The language and purposes of the Clayton Act and general
considerations of antitrust policy all counsel restraint in awarding
damages to unestablished businesses. The need for restraint is best
served by compensating unestablished ventures under section 4
only for the losses they suffer to property.
A. Majority Approach
Most courts consider the damage claims of -an unestablished
venture as a question of whether there has been an injury to the
plaintiff's business. If business injury is found, the courts express
vant time period. See, e.g., Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Brookside Theatre Corp.,
194 F.2d 846 (8th Cir.) (award based on comparison of theater's profits when operated by
plaintiff subject to antitrust violation with profits when operated by defendant), cert. de-
nied, 343 U.S. 942 (1952); Homewood Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 110 F. Supp. 398 (D.
Minn. 1952) (plaintiff's profit experience compared to that of another theater), appeal dis-
missed, 207 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1953). Such comparisons are speculative, however, particu-
larly when the businesses being compared are not very similar and when, as with unestab-
lished businesses, the degree of similarity is itself a matter of speculation. See generally
Rulon, supra note 13, at 159-63. The Supreme Court nevertheless noted the yardstick test
with approval in Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 260 (1946).
80 Indeed, it would seem that the target area test would immediately preclude awarding
damages to many unestablished businesses. The philosophy of the target area test is that
defendants are liable when they subjectively aim their violations at specific plaintiffs. 2 P.
AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 3, 334(d), at 165-66. When a business is not yet estab-
lished, it is difficult to show that a defendant subjectively intended to harm it. Proponents
of the target area test support it precisely because it limits the number of potential plain-
tiffs. To open the "floodgates" to unestablished businesses would give the same result as
allowing non-target area plaintiffs to sue: "an over-kill, due to an enlargement of the private
weapon to a caliber far exceeding that contemplated by Congress." Calderone Enters. Corp.
v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292, 1295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 930 (1972).
It is possible, however, for an unestablished business to be a "target" or "a person
against whom the conspiracy was aimed," id., if, for example, the defendant intended to
prevent all competition, present and future, and targeted his violative behavior accordingly.
But given the fear of expansive recovery out of which the target area test arose, it is unlikely
that unestablished businesses will pass the target area test often.
The continued viability of the target area test is in doubt. In McCready, the Supreme
Court constructed a new test to analyze antitrust standing without explicitly evaluating ex-
isting tests, such as the target area test. See supra note 18. The court cast doubt on the
target area test, stating that "[t]he availability of the § 4 remedy to some person who claims
its benefit is not a question of the specific intent of the conspirators." Blue Shield v. Mc-
Cready, 102 S. Ct. 2540, 2548 (1982). Nonetheless, the Court made clear that recovery under
§ 4 must be limited. See id. at 2545-48; supra note 18.
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a willingness to award the plaintiff damages for lost future prof-
its.81 When stated this generally, the majority's approach conflicts
with section 4's policy of restraint. The majority's intent and
preparedness test, however, allows awards to unestablished busi-
nesses only when they demonstrate the following: (1) prior experi-
ence in the same field as the prospective venture; (2) affirmative
action to begin the proposed venture; (3) an ability to finance the
venture; and (4) the completion of contracts relating to the
venture.8 2
The intent and preparedness test appears in theory to be too
generous. Once the four criteria are met, a court following the test
would award lost profits based on predictions of how the nonopera-
tive enterprise might have operated in the future." This sort of
calculation is inherently speculative84 and risks producing duplica-
tive awards"5 and overdeterrence. 86 In fact, however, the test is
most often applied to deny awards. Although ostensibly allowing
recovery to a broad class of plaintiffs, the test in effect allows re-
covery only to operating businesses.87
In most instances when courts do award damages under the
test, a premise for the award is that the plaintiff has demonstrated
a property interest that the defendant's antitrust activities have
injured.88 In this sense, the result of the intent and preparedness
8, See sources cited supra note 7.
82 See Hayes v. Solomon, 597 F.2d 958, 973 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078
(1980) (citing Martin v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 365 F.2d 629, 633-34 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 991 (1966)).
:3 See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
84 See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
85 See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
88 See supra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
97 See, e.g., Hayes v. Solomon, 597 F.2d 958, 973-74 (5th Cir. 1979) (plaintiff lacked
firm plans, contracts, and finances; hence, plaintiff could not show preparedness), cert. de-
nied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980); Reaemco, Inc. v. Allegheny Airlines, 496 F. Supp. 546, 554
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (plaintiff had neither financial resources nor consummated contracts; there-
fore its venture was a mere "hope"); Laurie Visual Etudes, Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond's, Inc.,
473 F. Supp. 951, 955-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (plaintiff had finances and completed contract but
no prior experience in the field it wanted to enter, thus it failed the intent and preparedness
test); N.W. Controls, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 333 F. Supp. 493, 506-08 (D. Del. 1971)
(preliminary negotiations do not indicate sufficient intent and preparedness); Delaware Val-
ley Marine Supply Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 184 F. Supp. 440, 444-45 (E.D. Pa. 1960)
(unestablished business apparently met intent and preparedness test, but because of its lack
of business history, had to rely on a hypothetical profit theory which was too speculative to
allow an award), aff'd, 297 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 839 (1962).
" Courts have held that completed contracts are property that is protected under § 4.
North Tex. Producers Ass'n v. Young, 308 F.2d 235, 243 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 929 (1963); Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., 231 F. Supp. 72, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
Courts applying the intent and preparedness test look specifically for contracts with banks
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test is illogical because section 4 makes injury to property an inde-
pendent basis for recovery. If the antitrust violation injured prop-
erty, the award should be for property losses and not for lost busi-
ness profits. Moreover, because the test refuses awards to
entrepreneurs who suffer demonstrable property losses but who do
not satisfy the test's "business" criteria,89 the intent and prepared-
ness test unduly restricts awards under section 4.
B. Compensation for Injury to Property
The deficiencies of the intent and preparedness approach
would be eliminated if courts awarded damages to unestablished
businesses only for losses to property and refused to make awards
for business injuries, such as lost profits. In many situations, the
result of this rule will be the same as under an approach that con-
centrates on "business" harms, for there is a substantial overlap
between "business" and "property"; "[w]hen a commercial enter-
prise suffers a loss of money it suffers an injury in both its 'busi-
ness' and its 'property.' But neither term is rendered redundant by
recognizing" that the two terms can coincide.90 There are harms to
property that are not business harms.9 1
Because the statute is disjunctive, redressing injury to "busi-
ness or property," it is appropriate to distinguish the two types of
injury. Both words must have independent significance: "we must
assume that Congress by the use of both words did not use them
tautologically by way of unnecessary repetition, but intended
or promoters to secure needed funding, with prospective customers for future sales, with
suppliers of vital goods, or with potential partners who have necessary expertise. In the
absence of such contracts, the courts argue that plaintiffs have no more than a hope of
entering the venture. Martin v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 365 F.2d 629, 633-34 (5th Cir. 1966)
(contract to secure financing), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 991 (1966); Peller v. International Box-
ing Club, 227 F.2d 593, 596 (7th Cir. 1955) (boxing promoter needed contracts with boxers);
Laurie Visual Etudes, Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond's, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 951, 956 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (marketing contract); N.W. Controls, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 333 F. Supp.
493, 508 (D. Del. 1971) (contract with suppliers); Image & Sound Serv. Corp. v. Altec Serv.
Corp., 148 F. Supp. 2a7, 238-39 (D. Mass. 1956) (contract with customers); Pastor v. AT&T,
76 F. Supp. 781, 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) (contract to secure financing).
89 E.g., Laurie Visual Etudes, Inc. v. Chesebrough Pond's, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 951, 955-56
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (refusing award); see also Reaemco, Inc. v. Allegheny Airlines, 496 F. Supp.
546, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (noting that absence of any of the four factors will preclude~recov-
ery under the intent and preparedness test).
9o Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979).
91 See id. ("a consumer not engaged in a 'business' enterprise, but rather acquiring
goods or services for personal use, is injured in 'property' [and not in 'business'] when the
price of those goods or services is artificially inflated").
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something more by including" the two together.9 2 The Supreme
Court concluded in Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.9 3 that Congress's in-
tent is best served by giving the word "property" a wide scope.9'
To that end, lower courts have defined "property" expansively. For
example, a completed contract is "property" under the Clayton
Act,95 although contract negotiations do not rise to that level.96
Courts have defined property broadly enough to include expendi-
tures to defend against patent infringement suits97 and for suits to
recover the money that an overcharged customer paid,98 but not so
broadly as to include within section 4 all state law property
interests. 9
These broad definitions of property would allow a plaintiff
who had actually spent money on a venture to recover three times
his expenses from the antitrust violator who prevented the busi-
ness from operating. By allowing recovery in a broad category of
cases, the rule proposed here would eliminate the apparent harsh-
ness of forbidding lost profits awards to unestablished businesses.
This resolution does not just exchange one loose construction for
another, however; it replaces a rule capable of awarding lost profits
to a venture that never earned any profits with a rule that compen-
sates only concrete property losses.
By allowing recovery only to plaintiffs who have unique inju-
ries, the rule is consistent with section 4's goal of deterrence and
its policy of opening the courts to anyone injured by antitrust vio-
lations.100 Because it will allow damage awards only for claimants
92 Sullivan v. Associated Billposters & Distribs. of the United States & Can., 6 F.2d
1000, 1011 (2d Cir. 1925).
:3 442 U.S. 330 (1979).
" Id. at 338-39 (citing dictionary to illustrate the broad meaning of "property"). An
earlier case held that "'property' has a wider scope and is more extensive than the term
'business'" and "[l1ess is required to prove 'property' than to prove 'business.'" Waldron v.
British Petroleum Corp., 231 F. Supp. 72, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). The court also maintained
that "Congress intended this distinction [between business and property] to be meaning-
ful." Id. (footnote omitted).
'6 See supra note 88.
Peller v. International Boxing Club, Inc., 227 F.2d 593, 596 (7th Cir. 1955).
97 See Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Cincinnati Milacron, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 1040, 1088-
89 (S.D. Ohio 1975) (legal fees recoverable as harm to either business or property), aff'd, 562
F.2d 365 (6th Cir. 1977).
98 See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe
Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396 (1906) ("A person whose property is diminished
by a payment of money wrongfully induced is injured in his property."). See also Hawaii v.
Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 273-74 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
9 See 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 3, 1 334(b).
00 When an unestablished venture cannot demonstrate a loss to business or property as
defined in this comment, it may still have been harmed in some sense, but no differently
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who can demonstrate quantifiable, unique injuries to property, the
rule will prevent speculative and duplicative awards.10 1 Finally, be-
cause the cost of the damage awards for property losses more
nearly approximate the social costs of antitrust violations than do
lost profit awards,10 2 the rule proposed here poses less of a risk of
overdeterrence.110
CONCLUSION
Most courts focus on the "business" clause of section 4 and
use the intent and preparedness test to determine when to make
awards to unestablished businesses. In theory, this test allows
awards to a broad category of plaintiffs, placing the test in conflict
with policies against overdeterrence and speculative or duplicative
awards. In practice, the test severely limits the number of plaintiffs
who may recover, and in this way it conflicts with section 4's pur-
pose of providing a remedy for anyone injured by antitrust viola-
tions. Instead of using the intent and preparedness test to compen-
sate "business" losses, courts should award damages for injuries to
property of unestablished businesses. By focusing on concrete
property losses, courts can avoid speculative and duplicative
awards while also providing a remedy to all parties injured by anti-
trust violations. Such a rule is also consistent with the statute's
from the public. In these instances, the remedy must be a public one achieved through suit
by the Attorney General pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 4, 9 (1976). See United States v. ITT, 349
F. Supp. 22, 27 (D. ,Conn. 1972) (private individual must show personal stake; Attorney
General represents the public interest in federal antitrust proceedings), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 919 (1973); Robinson v. Lull, 145 F. Supp. 134, 137 (N.D. Ill. 1956) (if a member of the
public sees a monopoly but is not harmed by it himself, he has no standing to sue; it is the
Attorney General's function to bring suit to rectify the matter); supra notes 57-62 and ac-
companying text. See generally Brownlee v. Malco Theatres, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 312, 316-17
(W.D. Ark. 1951) (no recovery because plaintiff unestablished business's injuries no different
from those of the public); Note, Standing to Sue for Treble Damages Under Section 4 of
the Clayton Act, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 570, 573-74 (1964) (injury must be different from that
suffered as a member of the general public).
101 Cf. supra notes 61-80 and accompanying text (discussing speculative and duplicative
awards).
10I The social cost of an antitrust violation includes the total lost profits of those busi-
nesses that would have earned profits had there been no antitrust violation. Although an
unestablished venture may be precluded from conducting business by an antitrust violation,
it also may never have earned profits, even absent an antitrust violation; many new busi-
nesses fail for reasons other than antitrust violations, see supra note 14. A system that bases
antitrust damage awards on hypothetical lost profits for such ventures will overcompensate
plaintiffs relative to the true social costs of the violation. See supra text following note 69.
Awards for property losses, but not lost profits, will necessarily be lower and therefore will
more closely approximate the social costs of violations.
101 Cf. supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text (discussing overdeterrence).
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language; it accords independent significance to the "property"
clause without distorting the ordinary meaning of "business." Fi-
nally, it is consistent with section 4's economic purpose because it
will foster an efficient level of deterrence of antitrust violations.
Todd Marcus Young
